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SCOTLAND AND THE GEOMETRIC IMAGINATION

Matthew Wickman. Literature After Euclid: The Geometric Imagination in
the Long Scottish Enlightenment. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016. Pp. viii + 293. Hardback, $69.95, £45.50. ISBN
978-0-8122-4795-4.
Matthew Wickman’s expansive, eloquently written, and ingeniously wellcrafted book comes at an auspicious time given what he rightly calls “the
mathematical turn in literary studies” (1). In a very direct way, the
Enlightenment problem of “the exponential increase in information” (1)
foreshadowed our present-day problems about what to do when literary and
other forms of knowledge are no longer tethered, as they were in the
eighteenth century, to the medium of print. As Wickman points out at the
start of his book, data in the more capacious numerical form we call digital
is as much a turn back toward one revolution in the history of media as a
move forward toward a newer one. This time, the computational enigma is
intensified, but it is resolved now, as before, in geometrical form. The
Scottish Enlightenment haunts the production of knowledge in general
today, and this looping between then and now is itself fixed within a
common late-Euclidian enigma.
I use that word haunt in a way that is consistent with Wickman’s general
argument. One of the risks of scale that we confront in affirming a
“mathematical medium for theoretical and poetic thought” (12) is that we
confront what we cannot see only through certain practices of rendering the
invisible empirically measurable, and therefore, something both imagined
and real. For Wickman’s practitioners, these are literally figurative, visual
or map-making modalities of thought. The promise here, thinking of the
physicist David Deustch’s notion of infinity, is like knowing that the
universe is inconceivably large but that you can still conceive greater and
greater knowledge of it over time.1 Even shadow photons are measurable
given proper tools. You can know more things about reality, and then act
better from there.
Wickman manages to give new significance to a sweepingly vast
archive, putting into practice the same figural exercises of rendering large
scales of information into new orders of understanding that many of his key
1

See, e.g., David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform
the World (London: Penguin, 2011).
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writers, counters, geometers, and experimenters work through within their
own genres, disciplines, and forms. The book runs smartly through a gamut
of (mostly) English and Scottish mathematicians (such as Maclaurin,
Stewart, Simson), philosophers and moral philosophers (Reid, Smith, Hume,
Kant), novelists, poets, and critics (Scott, Burns, Thomson, Kames). These
thinkers are—without messing up the mapping—put in conversation with a
careful selection of influential voices in contemporary theory (Badiou,
Lyotard, Meillassoux).
Wickman is not arguing that all of his literary and philosophical
examples had direct knowledge of Euclid, or more to the historical point,
that they all struggled explicitly with the challenges of Newton’s fluxional
calculus. It must be noted though, given the centrality of “geometrical
reasoning” in Scottish—but not English—universities, that a great many key
Enlightenment thinkers did know Euclid's work directly (8). We learn from
Wickman how to think about the dynamics of disciplines in the same way
he gets us to think about how literary canons are made, how they are un- and
re-made (a profound effect of the digital humanities), and how form and
number square off and change.
Geometrical reason applies to how the boundaries of genres get drawn
while still riddled with traces of alternative forms (as seen in the false
division between gothic and realism). It applies also to how historical
periods begin and end, and yet how they go on existing in occulted ways
(why not include Baudelaire, Valery, and Poe with Thomson and
company?). There is a Euclidian dimension to how labor power is made
invisible (note here Wickman’s deft critique of Smith, apropos Burns, on
sympathy); and to how Scottish nationalisms manage to be both highly
particular and universal (the Act of Union’s incapacity to create a United
Kingdom). These issues are featured, throughout “the long looping
eighteenth century” (5, my emphasis)
In all of these instances, Wickman reveals a consistency of practice
regarding how Enlightenment thinkers crafted relationships as new points of
reference emerged: There was, and—as we reread these thinkers as
surprisingly compatible with our own historical moment—there is more than
meets the eye. The general point of linking the geometrical sciences with
the literary imagination across increasingly larger orientations of space and
time is to allow us to deal usefully with the more. We can, and early modern
geometrical reasoners did, render the “strange” into “knowledge,” and from
there move knowledge ahead toward “new ends” (5). This is especially
significant when we realize that what we are reasoning about is the nature
of reason itself, which is an intrinsic part of the reality it tries to explain.
But like the “doubleness of perspective” in Joanna Baillie’s lateeighteenth century plays—she was fascinated by Plato’s definition of
geometry—those explanations “take contingent forms in everyday life” as
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“conflicting dramatic imperatives” (4). This is why aesthetics never fully
diverges far from epistemological concerns, nor these concerns from social
and political ones. “Connections,” and here Wickman is referring to
Scottishness both as a period in time and as a national category, “leave off
[where others] begin,” and “often wind round themselves, fashioning strange
and sometimes contorted designs from the original flow of time” (6). What
motors the “reconfigurations of form and history [is a] mathematical
unconscious” (4). Numbers both “undercut the presumption of progress” (6,
my emphasis), and in the geometrically inspired form of Wickman’s own
book, create the kind of knowledge we can measure as new. Our “journey
into mathematical darkness” (17) is the more remarkable for our eventual
arrival at light.
The organization and specific examples used by Wickman are as forceful
as his argument overall. The book is divided into three parts: Part I provides
a theoretical overview of the importance of shape and time along the lines I
have followed above. Chapter 1, for example, elaborates the key concept of
Newtonian fluxions. These “distortional mirrors held to nature” (37) work
in contrast with Descartes’s grids and Leibniz’s algebra, as “the
contemplation of figures” (50), and as “a new way of configuring the
passage of time” (37) in the form of seeing shapes and arranging them in
useful ways. Wickman mentions Professor Simson’s translation of Euclid’s
Elements in 1756 as contributing to a wave of spatial experimentation in
motion since Newton, most notably, in Reid’s “Common Sense” school of
philosophy.
Reid is not discussed at length until chapters 5 and 6. But in Chapter 1,
and in Wickman's introduction, the Common Sense school is singled out as
“a dynamic thought experiment” (7). While not adhering to Euclidian
concepts of space, the example of Reid shows especially well how geometry
was “a poetic or creative language” (46). Leaving Reid to the side, Wickman
moves in Chapter 2 through a “backward chronology” (16) to Scott’s
shaping practices, specifically, in Guy Mannering. Here, on the order of
Newton's fluxional understanding of “the flow of time,” we may see a
“mathematical anticipation of historical fiction” (59): the “image of the
Jacobite” depends upon “the conversion of quantity into quality,” which in
turn reveals the connection between Scottish nationalism, the significance
of “interpretation, and the meaning of form” (92, emphasis mine).
Part II of Wickman’s book further delineates “iconic exhibits of the
geometrical imagination” (14) in Scottish Enlightenment culture. In chapter
three, the focus is on “how theorists of the picaresque negotiated the limits
of classical geometry in the scenic and verbal ways they arranged the
Scottish landscape” (15). Here the common tropes of Scottish
romanticism—“bizarre forms of nature” (15), “emptiness” (96), the
“interstitial” state, the “uncanny” (107), and not least, “the sublime” (107)—
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are given their geographical and ontological due. But this is not a rote
affirmation of the Romantic rejection of science. Wickman’s sublime is a
“mathematical sublime” (107, my emphasis), which means that
“multiplicity” and “the unrepresentable” (112) are invitations for the
experimenter to render a heretofore unfathomable world provisionally
knowable through the artifice of geometrical reason.
The violent removal of people during the Highland Clearances does not
merely signify emptiness, or (Wickman is here recalling Marx) a “visibly
empty” result of the “social process of depletion” (115). Rather, this
emptiness is “filled with history and therefore meaning” (116). Though the
Highland landscape “bears the marks of multiple erasures,” we can still
know things about it and act better, still have our cake of the so-called
“sublime” and eat our “politics of resistance and social critique” (115). The
“uncanny” does not forbid what Clifford Siskin and William Warner insist
is the Re:Enlightenment project of error correction.2
This is what makes Chapters 4 and 5 the two highlights of Wickman’s
exceptionally consequential book. Chapter 4 comes directly to Wickman’s
ultimate point, which is to reveal the far-reaching significance of the
"conflict between form and number" (16). Conflict doesn't go away in the
form of reducing the estranging (and we should say, Enlightening)
vicissitudes of number to the mere complacency of form. On this point,
Wickman stages a masterful comparison between Burns and Smith on moral
sympathy. He shows how Burns “gives voice to the multitude … [as] unable
to become ‘one’” (152), where oneness means an idealistically synthesized
form of unity or wholeness, as in Smith's desire for a commercial socius
undisturbed by “structural imbalance” (155).
Wickman echoes Ian Duncan’s observation that Smith’s version of moral
sympathy “flattens” any social fluxion deemed inimical to the operations of
the capitalist marketplace.3 “Sentimental gazing … sublates … divisive
feelings into a series of orderly, generally socially progressive social
operations” (153; 155).4 In contrast with the commercially directed
triangulation of the spectator (the flat geometrical relation between the
onlooker, the sufferer, and the ideal), Burns presents us “less with
substitutions than with networks,” and “with a concept of human nature and
2

See, e.g., Clifford Siskin and William Warner, This is Enlightenment (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2010); and cf. Siskin, System: the Shaping of Modern
Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016), 88, 101.
3 Ian Duncan, Scott’s Shadow: The Novel in Romantic Edinburgh (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007), 265.
4 Full disclosure: I made the same argument with Warren Montag in our recent book:
Mike Hill and Warren Montag. The Other Adam Smith. (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2015).
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civil society” that has a “virtually infinite plenitude of relations” (156). As
such, Burns as “plowman-poet”—and equally, Burns as moral geometer—
works in a way that is both laborious and aesthetic, both useful and beautiful,
both real and artificially made.
Chapter 5, which initiates the final section of the book, may be regarded
as a close companion to Chapter 4, and an equal highlight, for the same
reason of moving between “the mystery of fluxions” (136), “the uncanny
artifact” (134), and “what counts” (145). Wickman returns here more
squarely to Newton in order to “bypass a certain romantic ideology,” for
example in Kant and Wordsworth, that rejects Enlightenment science for the
compensatory experiences of subjectivity and the imagination. Wickman’s
goal here is to show how the “practical efficacy” of Newton’s fluxional
calculus need not jettison its corresponding “riddles” (16). His counter
example to traditional romantic rejections of empirical reality is Thomson’s
The Seasons, which he describes as example of “poetic counting” (176).
Here we see “not only an encomium to science but also a self-reflexive
celebration of poetry” that “bestows the title of poietes—‘maker’—on
Newton” (176). In this “strange merger of the empirical and the ideal” (165),
the “logic of figure” that is implicit within “Newtonian geometry [is]
extended into the domain of the literary” (165). This is not a simple
reduction of the real world to what is habitually imagined to be real, as in
Kames’s “ideal presence” (178). Rather, Thomson’s poem is an exercise in
geometrical reason: “imagination necessarily supplements the abstraction of
science,” and "the mind [gains] harmonious relation to its tools as well as its
environment” (167). New knowledge begins where idealism “seems to
decompose” (179).
Wickman’s concluding arguments in Chapter 6 push toward “the
historical limits—the origins and aftermaths—of [an] eccentric
Euclidianism” that reaches well into twentieth- and twenty-first-century
modernisms. Here Reid returns with full significance, as his “geometry of
visibles” bend towards “speculation on multidimensional spaces,” both in
“praise—and as a critique—of Newton” (198). In this final move of the
argument, Reid’s critique of idealism reaches toward the discrete lineage of
such temporally and geographically diverse movements as the Celtic
modernism of MacDiarmid in the early 1920s, the French Symbolists poets
before that, Poe in his poem Eureka, “the zigzagging lines of the vorticism
movement” (210), and contemporary speculative realists who are today
attempting to reclaim significance (contra Kant) for the “Thing Itself” (215).
Regarding Ossian, the gothic, Scottish nationalism, the Union, the
Enlightenment, and all the rest, as problems of “the complexity of form”
(52), Wickman’s extraordinary book attempts to “throw a wrench into grand
narratives about modernity” (52). That may be what it does. But Wickman
must also know that wrenches can be used in other—better—ways. He must
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know this because Literature After Euclid provides better wrenching in the
form of a grander narrative than existed in the grand narratives that came
before. In this, Wickman himself becomes the figure of the plowman-poet
he assigns to Burns, producing a form of historical mapping that brings into
fuller view a modernity we never knew that we had.
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